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THE FAIR VALUE OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS – NESTLÉ’S CASE STUDY 
Mariana Tavares Cadete 
 
The issuance of IFRS 2 – Share-based payment, in 2004, raised several criticisms, mostly 
related with one specific type of share-based payment transaction – employee stock 
options (ESO). The mandatory recognition and disclosure of its fair value impacted not 
only profitability, but also a corporate governance related issue – executives’ 
remuneration. Given the specificities of this particular type of call options, entities are 
faced with some difficulties in applying option pricing models to its valuation, but are also 
faced with opportunities to exercise managerial discretion over the model inputs. This 
thesis analyses and comments IFRS 2 guidelines in detail, supported by existing literature. 
It also applies the guidelines provided by this standard to a specific case study – Nestlé’s 
employee stock options granted in 2011 - to truly understand the difficulties and 
opportunities that an entity faces when estimating fair value of ESO. After providing 28 
valid alternative valuations for the same ESO grant, we conclude that, in 2011, Nestlé 
apparently understated the amount expensed with regard to the ESO granted, possibly 
due to opportunistic motivations to reduce the perceived executives’ remuneration and to 
increase the perceived entity’s profitability. To finalise, we provide recommendations on 
additional disclosures, which would improve the transparency and quality of the 
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 Fair Value Accounting has become a topic of increased relevance in recent years. 
Since its first introduction in the International Accounting Standards (IAS, or IFRS – 
International Financial Reporting Standards since 2003) in 1982, the use of fair value as a 
measurement method has increased significantly. 
 In 2004, fair value measurement reached employee stock option grants, a form of 
compensation that typically features in executives’ remuneration packages. It was one of 
the most controversial topics covered by the IASB (International Accounting Standards 
Board), in IFRS 2 – Share-based Payment. This standard and the corresponding under U.S. 
GAAP1, SFAS2 123 R, mandate all share-based payment, including employee share options, 
to be accounted for at its fair value. The need to account for employee share options (ESO) 
emerged from the quest for accountability of the remuneration packages of executives, 
where this remuneration feature was increasingly used, reaching in 2001 40% of the total 
remuneration package of a CEO from an S&P 1500 firm, according to a study conducted by 
Lord and Saito (2010). Already in 1996, Huddart and Lang (1996) alerted for the fact that 
the financial statements that did not recognise employee share options at its fair value 
were omitting a component of compensation from the net income computation, thus not 
being a faithful representation of the entity’s financial position. 
 Fair value measurement of employee stock options presents several difficulties. 
First, the value of the employee stock options must reflect the services provided to the 
entity by the employee who receives this share-based payment. However, like IFRS 2 
mentions, there is no way of measuring reliably the services provided by the employee in 
question. The standard mandates, then, that the services are measured with reference to 
the equity instruments granted to the employee – the stock options, which differ from 
common stock call options due to their specificities, in particular the non-transferability of 
the majority of these option grants, the existence of vesting conditions and its long 
maturity. Since employee stock options are not traded, there is an inability to estimate fair 
value of the instruments according to their market-value, the most reliable source. The 
entities are left with the need to estimate the value according to option pricing models, 
which unfortunately do not fully incorporate the specificities of employee stock options. 
 All these restrictions in the fair value measurement of ESO raise two main 
criticisms that are shared with the criticism against fair value measurement in general, in 
the absence of market values: the reliability of fair value estimations through modelling is 
                                                             
1 GAAP – Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
2 SFAS – Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 





















questionable and the entities are left with too much power to exercise discretion over the 
model inputs. 
 The goal of this dissertation is to analyse in detail the application of IFRS 2 to the 
measurement of employee share options, in order to understand if the criticisms raised 
against fair value accounting are sound, and to provide recommendations for both entities 
and standard setters to improve the quality and transparency of the information reported. 
After having deeply analysed the standard, we will go further and apply the guidelines by 
using Nestlé’s options granted in 2011 under the Management Stock Option Plan as a case 
study. During this analysis, we will have the opportunity to understand what are the 
problems that entities are faced with when estimating fair value through the Black and 
Scholes formula, and to appreciate to what extent firms can exercise managerial discretion 
over the inputs and still “follow the rules”. 
 After the analysis, we conclude that measuring employee stock options according 
to its fair value is not as accurate as would be desirable, but since we recognise that, as any 
other form of compensation, they should be expensed, fair value is the best option 
available. 
 In our case study, we were are able to provide 28 valid alternative fair value 
measurements of the same employee stock option grant, proving that, although we believe 
fair value is the best measurement option available, the Black and Scholes formula is not 
able to fully incorporate the specificities’ of ESO and that the use of fair value leaves room 
for the companies to understate or overestimate the amount to be expensed by 
manipulating the model inputs. We believe that in 2011 Nestlé exercised an opportunistic 
behaviour over the model inputs and underestimated the expense recognised with regard 
to the ESO granted, probably due to a will to improve the profitability perceived by 
investors and to reduce the perceived executive compensation, typically considered 
excessive. This interpretation is in line with the motivations for opportunistic behaviour 
referred by Aboody et al. (2006) and Hodder et al. (2006). 
 The paper is organised as follows. Section II presents the literature background 
on the fair value concept. Section III focuses on understanding the controversy around 
IFRS 2, on explaining what makes employee stock options different from plain-vanilla call 
options and on explaining and commenting how IFRS 2 mandates that these instruments 
are valued. Section IV is the case study itself, it starts by providing an overview of Nestlé 
and its employee stock option plan, followed by a deep analysis of the assumptions behind 
the valuation of these instruments, and ends with an analysis of the results achieved with 
our alternative valuations. Finally, in section V, the main conclusions and the managerial 
implications of our analysis are presented.  























II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 To support this dissertation, it is essential to start by analysing its basis – Fair 
Value accounting under the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS). For this, we 
will look at published documents (e.g.: papers, articles, books and surveys) and extract 
insights to be able to: clarify the definition of fair value; give guidelines about its 
measurement; make an analysis of the arguments given in favour and against this 
measurement concept; and also evaluate the perceived impact of this measurement 
concept in the recent financial crisis. 
 At a final stage in this section, an overview of IFRS 2 – Share-based payment will 
be made, since it is the standard that covers the specific topic of this dissertation – 
Employee-share options. 
II. a) The need for IFRS and the emergence of Fair Value 
One of IFRS Foundation’s main objectives is “to develop a single set of high quality, 
understandable, enforceable and globally accepted international financial reporting 
standards (IFRSs) through its standard-setting body, the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB);”3 
“Accounting measurement is relevant only because we live in an imperfect world 
where markets are not always fully liquid, firms’ decision makers may have private 
information that cannot be readily disclosed to outsiders, and decision makers’ incentives 
may be distorted.” (Sapra, 2009) 
 The lack of transparency that exists in this imperfect world is one of the issues 
that the IASB and the FASB4 (Financial Accounting Standards Board) have tried to address 
over the years. The accounting standard setters develop and improve the standards and 
one of the goals they have in mind is to increase the transparency of the entities 
disclosures. Another objective of the IASB and the FASB is “to identify the measurement 
concepts which provide the most decision-useful information to the recipients of financial 
accounting information”5. The introduction and the increased use of Fair Value as a 
measurement criterion is one of the actions taken to achieve both objectives. 
                                                             
3 IFRS Foundation website 
4 The IASB is the body that publishes the IFRS, for an international context, whereas the FASB has 
the same duties but in the U.S., publishing the SFAS. 
5 IFRS Foundation Website 























II. b) IFRS 13 – The Unification of Fair Value 
 In June 2011, IFRS 13 - Fair Value Measurement was issued by the IASB, although 
it will only be effective beginning on or after 1 January 2013. The issuance of this standard 
constitutes a way for companies to have a more comprehensive and cohesive 
interpretation of the broad concept of fair value and its several applications. Additionally, 
this standard is fully converged with the respective one under US GAAP - SFAS 157. 
 In IFRS 13, an underlying conceptual framework of fair value is created, where 
the main steps for establishing the fair value amount are defined. Within this framework, 
the valuation techniques and the fair value hierarchy are explained and clarified. 
 This standard does not extend the use of fair value measurements and it is 
applicable whenever another IFRS requires or permits the use or disclosure of fair value 
measurements. However, the scope of IFRS 13 considers only the use of fair value if: 
 Each use of fair value in IFRSs is consistent with an exit price notion; and 
 Each IFRS’s measurement guidance is consistent with the one being developed in 
the fair value measurement project. 
 As KPMG (2011) concludes, this eliminates some transactions from the scope of 
IFRS 13, being one of them the most relevant type of transactions for this dissertation: 
share-based payment transactions that are within the scope of IFRS 2 - Share-based 
Payment. 
II. c) Definition of Fair Value in IFRS 
 According to Cairns (2006), the first time the term “fair value” was used by the 
IASC (International Accounting Standards Committee, replaced by the IASB in 2001) was 
in IAS 16 Accounting for Property, Plant and Equipment issued in March, 1982, where it 
was defined as: 
“The amount for which an asset could be exchanged between a knowledgeable, willing 
buyer and a knowledgeable, willing seller in an arm’s length transaction.” (International 
Accounting Standard (IAS) 16 [1982].6) 
 Throughout the standards issued after 1982, whenever fair value measurement 
was mentioned, it was defined and explained, sometimes with slight differences when 
compared to the first definition. The fair value concept did not change significantly 
throughout time, and its use under the accounting rules became increasingly common. 
With the issuance of IFRS 13, the definition of fair value, whenever this IFRS applies, is the 
following: 























 “The price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly 
transaction between market participants at the measurement date.” 
 Although this definition is focused on assets and liabilities, IFRS also requires the 
application of fair value to certain equity instruments. 
 We will now analyse in more detail this definition: 
“Price to be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability”: 
 Since it refers to the price to be “received”, it is an exit price. The use of an exit 
price is justified by IASB as being always a relevant definition, regardless of the intentions 
of the entity to use or to sell the associated asset. This logic is explained by the FASB and 
recalled by Catty (2012) – an exit price reflects the expectations of future cash inflows and 
outflows associated with the item. An asset generates cash inflows and outflows 
regardless if the company uses it or sells it. A similar reasoning can be made regarding 
liabilities – the exit price reflects the expectation of cash outflows if the entity intends to 
fulfil the liability over time, but also reflects the value of the liability if the entity transfers 
it to another party. 
“Orderly transaction” 
 Like it is stated by Mackenzie et al. (2012), “an orderly transaction is a 
transaction that assumes exposure to the market for a period before the measurement 
date to allow for marketing activities that are usual and customary for transactions 
involving such assets and liabilities; it is not a forced transaction (e.g. a forced liquidation 
or distress sale.)” 
 If the transaction is not orderly, there is not enough competitive tension and this 
may lead to potential buyers reducing the price that they are willing to pay for the asset.  
“Market participants”  
 The market participants referred to in the definition of fair value are participants 
that buy and sell in the particular market involved, and it is assumed that these 
participants would behave in their best economic interest. As highlighted by Mackenzie et 
al. (2012), there are four main features that these market participants must have: 
 Independence of the relevant entity; 
 Knowledge – they must have sufficient information, as much as the reporting 
entity has, about the item and potential sale; 
 Financial ability to enter a transaction for the item; and 
 Willingness to enter the transaction, i.e., they must be motivated, but never forced 
or compelled to enter the deal. 























 When the entity cannot identify a potential profile of a buyer, as it happens in 
many intangible assets, an entity should construct a hypothetical market for the asset in 
which the item could theoretically be sold. 
 
 After a detailed analysis of the definition of fair value, it is relevant to clarify that 
fair value is not the same as value in use. As it is denoted by Hitz (2007), fair value 
measurement differs from value in use since it does not include entity-specific competitive 
advantages, such as private skills or private information. 
II. d) Valuation Techniques 
 There are three valuation techniques that are accepted to measure fair value – 
market, cost or income approach – which are highlighted in IFRS 13. The only guideline 
given by the standards when it comes to choosing which technique to apply to measure 
the fair value is when active markets exist, in which the standards mandate that actual 
prices should be used (market approach). Otherwise, there is no prioritisation of which of 
the three techniques should be used. The choice of the technique is commonly constrained 
by the availability of inputs and their relative reliability. Thus all valuation techniques 
should be considered and the one that appears more appropriate should be applied. Like it 
is stated by Catty (2012), in some occasions, it may be applicable to use multiple 
techniques. Then, the management should weigh the several results and create a range of 
possible values, later identifying the fair value as the most representative point within that 
band, according to the specific circumstances. 
 Following one of the general features of IFRS, the entity must ensure consistency 
of presentation of financial statements. Like it stated in IAS 1.45, “an entity shall retain the 
presentation and classification of items in the financial statements from one period to the 
next”. This is also valid for the choice of valuation technique - it should be maintained from 
period to period and consistent throughout the type of assets, unless any change implies 
that another technique is more appropriate. Any revisions of the fair value resulting from 
a change of valuation technique or its application are considered changes in accounting 
estimates, which will affect the reported amounts in the current and future periods. 
 Below, we can find a detailed description of each valuation technique, according 
to Catty, 2012: 
i) Market-approach: this approach uses information (such as prices) generated by 
transactions of assets and liabilities or a group of assets and liabilities which are identical 
or comparable to the one being valued. 























ii) Cost-approach: this approach reflects the principle of alternatives, by reflecting the 
amount that would be required to duplicate, create or replace the asset for one that 
provided the same function and had the same utility. It is mostly applicable to the 
valuation of physical assets and some intangible assets, such as computer software. 
iii) Income-approach: this technique is based on the principle of future benefits. Thus, it 
converts futures amounts into a single amount, by using models such as the discounted 
cash flows. It is the most commonly used since frequently there is not enough available 
information for a market-based valuation, and the cost-approach is not relevant to some 
asset categories such as the financial assets.  
II. e) Fair Value Hierarchy 
 When measuring fair value, the entities use inputs, which are, in this context, the 
assumptions, the underlying data and the risk assessments used and made by the market 
participants. The inputs vary in terms of objectivity and the IASB established a three-tier 
hierarchy to classify the inputs, which is based on the extent to which these inputs are 
based on observable data. The IFRS requires the firms to maximise the use of level 1 
inputs – relevant and observable inputs.  
 The three defined levels are, in order of reliability: 
i) Level 1: Quoted prices that are not subject to any adjustment and that are observable, at 
the measurement date, in active markets for identical items. 
ii) Level 2: Quoted prices for the item (other than those included in level 1) that can be 
directly or indirectly observable for substantially the full term. These inputs are quoted 
prices for similar items traded in active markets; or quoted prices for identical or similar 
assets or liabilities in inactive markets; or even inputs that are derived from observable 
market inputs. 
iii) Level 3: Unobservable inputs that reflect the entity’s judgment of the assumptions 
made by market participants when valuing an identical item. Level 3 inputs may include a 
reporting entity’s own data and judgment. The use of accepted pricing methods for 
financial instruments and of a present value approach for other items is included in this 
level. Since it is the more subjective level of inputs, certain disclosures are required only 
for level 3 inputs. 
 
 























II. f) Fair Value vs. Historical Cost 
 To be able to compare both methods of measurement, it is relevant to recall the 
definition of historical cost.  Historical cost, as the name indicates, measures the items on 
the balance sheet by their cost. For example, an asset is recorded on the balance sheet with 
a value based on its nominal or original cost when it was acquired by the company. The 
fair value and the historical cost are the most common measurement methods and the 
situations under which they should be used are dictated in the IFRS. 
 After analysing the definitions of both fair value and historical cost, it is 
important to interpret the impact of using each of these measurements when analysing the 
financial statements. The table below summarises the “concepts behind fair value 
accounting and historical cost accounting”, according to the view of Penman, 2007, by 
looking at the two extremes: all items valued at fair value versus all items valued at 
historical cost. 
  
Table 1: Fair Value Accounting vs. Historical Cost Accounting 
Fair Value Accounting Historical Cost Accounting 
The primary vehicle for conveying 
information about value to shareholders is 
the balance sheet. 
The primary vehicle for conveying 
information about value to shareholders is 
the income statement. 
Volatility in earnings is informative for 
value at risk, since unexpected earnings (a 
shock to value) report on the risk of the 
equity investment. 
Earnings do not report shock to value, but 
shocks to trading in input and output 
markets. 
The book value of equity reports the value 
of equity (i.e. the Price-to-book ratio equals 
1,0). 
The Price-to-book ratio does not typically 
equal 1,0. 
The Price-to-Earnings Ratio (PER) is 
“Price/Shock-to-Value”, since it represents 
a realisation of value at risk. 
The PER takes current earnings as a base 
and multiplies it according to the forecast 
of future earnings. 
Looking at the income, it is possible to 
evaluate the management in their task of 
adding value for shareholders. 
Earnings measure the value creation by 
managers in arbitraging input and output 
markets (i.e. purchasing an input, 
transforming it according to the business 
model, and selling the consequent output 
over cost) 























II. g) Pros and Cons of Fair Value 
 As referred previously, the increased use of this measurement concept is driven by 
the belief that it will improve the reporting quality of financial accounts and that the 
financial statements will become more transparent, meaningful and comparable. However, 
although the benefits of fair value are theoretically sound, its application and 
implementation, in practice, give rise to some doubts about the benefits that it generates. 
Thus, this sub-section will focus on discussing the advantages and disadvantages of fair 
value, in order to understand the arguments that are present by both proponents and 
opponents. 
 
Penman (2007) enumerates several arguments that are usually present as the 
“pros” of fair value. These arguments are: 
 Fair values reflect more up to date information, since historical prices become 
irrelevant in assessing an entity’s current financial position with the passage of 
time. 
 Fair values reflect true economic substance and fair value accounting reports 
economic income. The changes in balance sheet fair values yields income, 
reflecting the change in wealth. 
 The information provided by fair value is more useful for investors, since they are 
concerned with value, not cost. 
 Since fair value is market-based, it is not affected by entity’s specific factors, so it 
represents an unbiased measure, consistent across entities and from period to 
period. 
However, Penman (2007) and other authors question the validity of some of these 
arguments. We will now discuss the issues that are raised against fair value. 
According to Hitz (2007), measurement perspective represents a traditional view 
on the information objective of financial reporting, and its notion is that “accounting 
should directly measure and report the basic information required by investors, which is 
the value of the firm, or at least a fraction of it”. However, as the same author concludes, 
fair value measurement does not always reflect the full value of an item. Actually, it 
typically undervalues the firm because market values do not incorporate competitive 
advantages that result from specific intangible assets.  
Another issue that is raised by the use of market prices is related with the 
efficiency of the markets (Penman, 2007; Sapra 2009). When the prices are inefficient, for 
example in market bubbles, these inefficiencies are brought to the balance sheet and the 























associated gains are reflected in the income statement (Penman, 2007). This may not be a 
relevant problem for short-term holdings, but when it comes to long-term holdings, for 
example associated with pension funds, it may create false appearances that in the future 
will result in losses and in artificial volatility. 
When there are no active markets and entities rely on valuation models, reliability 
concerns are raised. According to Hitz (2007) there is no sound theory for generalising the 
use of fair value to non-financial items such as intangibles and property, plant and 
equipment. In these situations, fair value becomes a “hypothetical market price”. These 
hypothetical market prices may also give rise to the previously referred artificial volatility. 
The issue of mismatching is referred by several authors (Hitz, 2007; Penman, 
2007) as a criticism of fair value income (recognition of fair value gains and losses). 
Mismatching occurs when an asset is valued at fair value but the associated liability is not 
(or vice-versa). This leads to the recognition of a gain in the income statement, without 
reporting offsetting losses (or vice-versa). As a result, there is excess volatility in earnings.  
However, those in favour of fair value income stress that these gains and losses 
reflect real economic volatility (Hitz, 2007). Additionally, they defend that the realisation 
of gains and losses based on objective market values serves as a way of reducing earnings 
management. 
The matter of earnings management and managerial opportunism is also typically 
referred as a criticism to the use of fair value. Particularly when there are no level 1 inputs, 
firms have some “room” available to determine the fair value, and by changing some 
assumptions of the valuations, they are able to control, to some extent, the gains or losses 
that are recognised. This matter is discussed by Enria et al. (2004) when looking at the 
implementation of Accounting Standards regarding pension funds.  
 When measuring at fair value is an option, managers may also take into 
consideration the impact on earnings in their decision of which measurement method to 
use. In Avallone and Quagli’s paper (2010), this is one of the issues analysed, by looking at 
a sample of European real estate firms and their decision of whether or not to use fair 
value as a measurement method for their investment properties, under IAS 40. The 
authors conclude that the choice between methods is actually influenced by the impact on 
earnings. 
After looking to all these aspects regarding fair value, it is important to consider 
the opinion of the users of financial accounting information regarding the measurement 
concepts.  A joint research project (Gassen and Schwedler, 2008), based on an online 























survey, questioned a group of users - professional investors and their advisors - about 
their opinions concerning the competing financial accounting measurement concepts6. 
 The main conclusions regarding the fair value “debate” were: 
 This group is familiar with the two more common measurement concepts: 
historical cost and fair value. Other concepts are less well known, such as value in 
use. 
 In general, investors favour the consistent application of fair value accounting for 
all items.  However, when asked more specifically about the issue in terms of the 
types of assets and liabilities, this opinion does not hold. 
o Mark-to-market fair value (with level 1 inputs) is considered to be the 
most decision-useful measurement concept for liquid and non-operating 
assets. 
o No significant difference in decision-usefulness is regarded between 
historical cost and market-based fair value, when applied for non-liquid 
and operating assets. 
o Mark-to-model fair values is only regarded as more decision-useful than 
historical cost for financial assets. For the remaining classes of assets and 
liabilities, mark-to-model fair values are regarded as significantly less 
decision-useful than historical cost measures and market-based fair values. 
After testing, the authors conclude that the sample is representative of “European 
professional investors and their advisors who have an interest in financial accounting 
matters”.  
 
These conclusions on the opinions of investors somehow reflect the main issue of the 
discussed pros and cons of fair value – the questionable reliability and usefulness of the 
fair values that are not based in observable market prices. 
II. h) Fair Value in the Recent Crisis 
 Several authors, such as Mackenzie et al. (2012), refer that the expanding use of 
fair value for accounting measurements raised several critical commentaries, and during 
the recent economic turmoil in credit market this debate has increased even more, since 
several have referred the increased mandatory use of fair value in financial reporting as a 
factor that exacerbated the turmoil. The chairman of Forbes Media, Steve Forbes, even 
                                                             
6 The online survey was based on a sample of 242 valid observations and the respondents are 
financial analysts, fund managers, institutional investors and rating experts from different 
countries. 10 countries had more than 10 respondents: Sweden (58), Germany, (43), Switzerland 
(41), Italy (20), Norway (12), the U.K.  (12) and Spain (11).  























stated that he believes fair value accounting was the “principal reason” for the meltdown 
of the U.S. financial system, according to Pozen (2009). According to the same author, the 
opponents of fair value, including many bankers and politicians, argue that the use of 
“mark-to-market” accounting led to much insolvency, since it pushed underperforming 
assets’ prices down. This forced the banks to sell their assets at low prices, pushing the 
values to an even lower level. 
 On the other hand, there are still those which defend fair value accounting. 
Poznen (2009) mentions that in Texas magazine, an accounting professor at the University 
of Texas, Lisa Koonce, wrote: “This is simply a case of blaming the messenger. Fair value 
accounting is not the cause of the current crisis. Rather, it communicated the effects of 
such bad decisions as granting subprime loans and writing credit default swaps… The 
alternative, keeping those loans on the books at their original amount, is akin to ignoring 
reality.” This view is shared by others, including the investment advisory group of the 
FASB. 
 A detailed analysis of the impact of financial reporting by banks in the financial 
crisis was conducted by Barth and Landsman (2010) and concluded, as others previously 
did, that “fair value accounting played little or no role in the Financial Crisis”. The same 
authors, however, mention that the transparency of information related to, and disclosed 
about, asset securitisations and derivatives was probably not enough for a proper 
assessment of the values and riskiness of the affected assets and liabilities from the 
investors. Additional measures to improve the disclosures of fair value related assets, 
particularly regarding banks, have been taken by the IASB and FASB since 2008 to provide 
the investors with the ability to correctly assess the risks related to the assets to which the 
banks are exposed to. 
II. i) IFRS 2 - Share-based Payment – Overview7 
 Until the issuance of IFRS 2 in 2004, which became effective in January 2005, 
there was no guidance under IFRS on how to recognise and measure transactions that 
involved share-based payment, where employee share-based compensation is included. 
Given the increasing relevance of share-based payment transactions in several countries, 
the prior lack of guidance raised concerns. 
 A share-based payment transaction is, according to IFRS 2, a transaction in which 
the entity receives goods or services from the supplier of those goods or services 
                                                             
7 This section is based on the version of International Financial Reporting Standard 2 – Share-based 
Payment that includes amendments resulting from IFRSs issued up to 31 December 2010, the 
version of IFRS 2 that was effective during the writing of this dissertation (February to May, 2012) 























(including an employee) as a consideration for its equity instruments, or incurs in a 
liability with the supplier of goods or services of an amount that is based on the entity’s 
equity instruments. Under the scope of this IFRS are items such as share appreciation 
rights, employee share purchase plans and the most relevant instrument for this 
dissertation – share option plans provided to employees. 
 The share-based payment accounting treatment depends on whether the 
transaction is settled by issuing equity, cash, or equity and cash: 
 equity-settled share-based payment transactions, occur whenever an entity 
receives goods or services as a consideration for equity instruments of the entity 
(including shares or share options); 
 cash-settled share-based payment transactions, is a transaction where the entity 
acquires goods or services and incurs in liabilities to the supplier of the goods or 
services for an amount that is based on the price of the entity’s share or other 
equity instruments of the entity; and 
 equity/cash –settled share-based transactions, occur when the entity (as the 
receiver of goods or services) or the supplier of goods and services has a choice of 
whether the transaction is settled in cash or by issuing equity. 
 Despite this distinction, the general rule is that all share-based payment 
transactions must be recognised at fair value and the recognition of an asset or expense is 
made when the goods or services are received. In IFRS 2, the definition of fair value is the 
following “the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, a liability settled, or an 
equity instrument granted could be exchanged, between knowledgeable, willing parties in 
an arm’s length transaction”. If a share-based payment is made to employees, the 
transaction must be measured according to the fair value of the equity instruments at the 
grant date, since the estimation of the fair value of the services provided by employees is 
typically not estimated with reliability. 
 The guidelines provided by IFRS 13 on how to measure fair value do not apply for 
IFRS 2. Actually, IFRS 2 provides an extremely detailed explanation on how to measure the 
most common type of share-based payment transaction – the equity-settled share-based 
payment transaction that is paid to employees, typically in the form of employee share 
options, the main subject of this dissertation that will be further discussed in the following 
chapters.  
  
















































III. HOW TO CALCULATE THE FAIR VALUE OF EMPLOYEE SHARE OPTIONS? 
 Since 2005, the recognition of employee share options is mandatory under IFRS 2 
– Share-based payment. Although the need for recognising this transaction in the financial 
statements is acknowledged by most users of financial information, the valuation of share-
based payments has raised several criticisms. 
 This section will discuss the concept of employee stock options and the need for 
expensing; how they differ from common stock options and how they must be valued 
under IFRS. 
 All the analysis will set the grounds for our case in the next section – the detailed 
analysis and presentation of alternative fair value measurements for Nestlé’s employee 
share options, according to its financial statements from the year of 2011. 
III. a) Employee stock options and the need for expensing these 
instruments 
 Employee stock options (or employee share options) are call options issued by a 
company on its own stock, given to its employees as part of their remuneration (Hull, 
2009), meaning that the employees will have the right to buy shares of the company at a 
predetermined price, under specific conditions, determined at the time of the issuance of 
the stock options. This type of share-based compensation is issued by public companies to 
its employees, typically executives, in order to align the incentives of management and 
those of shareholders, motivating the former to act in the best interests of the latter. As 
holders of stock options, the employees are more motivated to increase the share value, 
since they have a sense of ownership towards the company’s shares, and since they will 
also benefit from an increase in share value. 
 With the increased demand for accountability of executive remuneration 
packages, the need to expense the fair value of stock options emerged. FASB was the first 
to issue, in 1995, a standard (SFAS 123) that mandated the disclosure of the option value, 
but the expense of the fair value of the ESO was voluntary. In 2004, both the IASB and the 
FASB issued standards that mandated the expense of the fair value of share-based 
compensation, which include shares or rights to obtain shares. However, this change in the 
accounting rules introduced by IFRS 2 – Share-based Payment and by SFAS 123 (R) – 
Share-based Payment raised controversies.  
 There were those that defended that ESO should not be expensed because they 
do not actually cost money to the company and that if these options are converted into 
shares, the issuance of shares is not a cash outflow, as mentioned in Henderson, 2011. 
















































Actually, when exercised, share options raise money for the company since the holder of 
the option – in this case, the employee – must pay the predefined exercise price. It is also 
defended by some that the impact this compensation has on the results is already reflected 
when diluted Earnings per Share are calculated (if any of the options are in-the-money, 
these options have dilutive effect since companies will have to issue shares, increasing the 
number of shares outstanding). 
 Conversely, the proponents of expensing ESO argued that, as any other form of 
compensation, they should be expensed, like Huddart and Lang (1996) highlight. This is 
particularly relevant if we consider that ESO represent a significant percentage of total 
executive compensation. Among the S&P 1500 firms, the use of this compensation form 
reached its peak in 2001, representing 40% of the total CEO compensation (Lord and 
Saito, 2010). According to the same source, since then, with the burst of the dot.com 
bubble, the more strict Corporate Governance guidelines implemented by the Sarbon-
Oxley and the introduction of the  SFAS 123 (R), its use  is in decline and accounted in 
2007 for “only” 20% of total CEO remuneration. 
 Another reason to mandate the expensing of employee share options arose by the 
will to reduce the number of options granted. Several companies’ scandals, such as the 
Enron case, were partially caused by a will to inflate the results and by the fact that, 
similarly to shareholders or potential shareholders, managers were (too) motivated to 
increase the share price, since they would also benefit from it. Through the expensing of 
ESO, companies would probably be less generous with the options granted (in fact, after 
the standard’s implementation there is evidence suggesting that this method of 
compensation became less popular, as stated by Hull, 2009) and management’s incentive 
to “boost” the income would be reduced. Additionally, although the issuance of shares that 
occurs at the exercise date is not a cash outflow, it is a cost for the company (the cost 
associated with the transaction established between the company and its employees), 
therefore it should be reflected in the Income Statement. 
 An additional criticism raised against the share-based payment standards is 
related with the calculation of the option value, since the standards set the mandatory 
disclosure of the fair value of the options, as opposed to their intrinsic value. Since 
virtually all the employee share options cannot be traded, there is always a need to 
calculate the fair value of these instruments through the use of models. IFRS 2 allows the 
disclosure of the intrinsic value instead of the fair value only in extremely rare cases 
where the calculation of the fair value is not reliable. 
 An option only has intrinsic value when it is “in-the-money”, since its intrinsic 
value is the amount by which the current share price (market value) exceeds the strike 
















































price. The possibility of recording the ESO at their intrinsic value was previously allowed 
by the standards until 2004 and it was appealing for the companies, since most ESO are 
granted with an exercise price equal to the current market price (“at-the-money” option), 
hence having no intrinsic value when granted. 
 The estimation of fair value requires the use of valuation models, given the 
inability to obtain a similar instrument elsewhere. The inputs of these models rely on 
numerous assumptions and, therefore, can produce a range of possible values instead of a 
single definite value. Although these values are not 100% reliable, proponents of fair value 
argue that it is still better to have an estimated value than having no value at all. 
III. b) Factors that influence the option value 
 A typical call option on a share gives its holder the option, but not the obligation, to 
buy the share at a predetermined price at a certain date (European Option) or from 
issuance until that certain date (American Option). The holder will only have the incentive 
to exercise its right if the exercise price is lower than the current market price, so that 
he/she is able to acquire a share by an amount lower than its current value. Typically, 
these options can be sold to other individuals and their value is dependent on several 
factors. These factors and the effects of a change in one of them, with all others remaining 
constant, are analysed below8: 
 Exercise Price/Strike Price (X) – It is the price at which the option-holder has the 
right to buy the share. The lower the strike price, the higher the value of the 
option, since it increases the payoff of the option (the difference between the 
current market price and the strike price). 
 Current Market Price (S0) – The higher the market price, the higher the value of the 
option. 
 Volatility of the stock price (σ) – Volatility reflects the uncertainty about the price 
movements of the stock in the future. Thus, if volatility increases, the chances of 
the stock performing very well increases (i.e. its value increases), as well as the 
chances of performing badly. For a call-option holder, the benefits of a price 
increase are much more than the costs of a price decrease, since, at most, the 
holder loses the price paid for the option. 
 Amount of future dividends – Dividends reduce the stock price on the ex-dividend 
date, hence reducing the value of a call option. 
                                                             
8
 Insights extracted from Options, Futures and Other Derivatives, 7th Edition, Hull (2009) 
















































 Risk-free interest rate (r) – An increase in interest rates leads to an increase in the 
call option value. The increase in the interest rates tends to be reflected by an 
increase in the return required by investors on the stock. Plus, the present value of 
future cash flows received by the holder of the option decreases. The combined 
impact of these effects increases the value of a call option (Hull, 2009). 
 Time to expiration (T) – For an American Option,  the greater the time to 
expiration, the greater the value, because its owner has more exercise 
opportunities available when compared to the owner of a shorter time to maturity 
option. The effects of time to expiration in European Options are not necessarily 
the same. Usually European options are more valuable, the higher the time to 
expiration. However, specific events may change this. For example if a company 
intends to pay a dividend at time N, the value of the option at time N+1 will be 
lower than the value of the option at N-1, all else being equal. 
III. c) Specificities of employee stock options 
After looking at the main characteristics of a call option, it is necessary to 
understand what makes employee stock options different from “plain-vanilla” options. 
Below we will discuss the main specificities of this share-based payment. 
i) Vesting conditions 
 The IASB defines vesting conditions in IFRS 2 as: 
“The conditions that determine whether the entity receives the services that entitle the 
counterparty to receive cash, other assets or equity instruments of the entity, under a share-
based payment arrangement. Vesting conditions are either service conditions or 
performance conditions. Service conditions require the counterparty to complete a specified 
period of service. Performance conditions require the counterparty to complete a specified 
period of service and specified performance targets to be met (such as a specified increase in 
the entity’s profit over a specified period of time). A performance condition might include a 
market condition” [IFRS 2.A] 
 
 A market condition is a condition that relates to the company stock price, for 
example achieving a determined price or a determined return on the stock (IFRS 2.A). 
The vesting conditions are associated to a vesting period, during which these 
conditions must be satisfied, which typically lasts several years. It is only after this period 
and after having satisfied the conditions that the employees become entitled to the option. 
As a result, although the options are granted at a certain date, it is only after the vesting 
period that the holders have the possibility to exercise their right to purchase the shares 
until its expiration (assuming that the options are American, as the majority of ESO are). 
















































If they are not met within the predefined period, the employees lose the option to 
buy shares. In these situations, the options are forfeited.  
ii) Continued employment requirement 
A typical feature of employee share options is that there is a “continued 
employment requirement” (Ernst & Young, 2012). If the options have already vested when 
the holder terminates his/her employment for the entity, in principle the employee will be 
forced to exercise them within a short period of time, or even immediately. This eliminates 
the time value9 component of the option, which lowers its value. If the employees 
terminate their employment before the options have vested, typically these ESO are lost. 
iii) Non-transferability and limited ability to hedge option values 
 Most employee stock options cannot be traded, whereas ordinary share options 
can. Additionally, option holders can eliminate their exposure by taking a short position in 
a contract with the same terms that eliminates the current position. ESO’s holders are 
prohibited to trade these instruments and typically they cannot find similar contracts “in 
the markets” in which they could take a short position, given the specificities of these sort 
of contracts and the long time to maturity when compared to call options commonly 
traded in exchanges or OTCs10. This limits the ability of the employee to use an ESO to 
satisfy any liquidity need by any mean other than by exercising its right. 
Employees usually have limited ability to trade shares of the entity to which they 
work and own ESO. To hedge the exposure to the employee share option, a possibility 
could be to short-sell the shares of the entity, but employees may not be allowed to do this. 
Even if the employees were allowed to trade shares of the firm, it would be negatively 
perceived by the market because it would be as if the employees were betting on a 
decrease in the share price.  
The inability to sell their ESOs and to short-sell the underlying shares is pointed 
out by Huddart (1994) as a suggestion that the employees are entirely exposed to the risk 
of these compensation instruments. This two features of ESO lead to an early exercise of 
the option, because, in most situations, it is the only way the holders have to eliminate 
their exposure and to monetise value. The early exercise of the option leads to a lower 
option value, given that it loses its time value.  
Empirical studies, such as Hemmer et al. (1994) and Huddart and Lang (1996), 
confirm that ESO tend to be exercised early. Hemmer et al. (1994) suggest that the 
                                                             
9
 Time value is the value of an option that arises from the time left to maturity and is affected by the 
interest rate, the volatility and the dividend yield of the underlying share. 
10
 Over-the-Counter 
















































likelihood of early exercise is higher for options with higher volatility. Huddart and Lang 
(1996) suggest that the exercise is spread over time and that it is difficult to predict 
exercise behaviour by looking at comparable firms. 
iv) Periods during which exercise is restricted 
 Although employee stock options can be exercised any time from vesting date until 
expiration of the option, this type of stock options may be subject to “blackout” periods. 
During these periods, the holders cannot exercise their options. This is a common 
particularity of an ESO contract, for different purposes such as to prevent insider trading. 
v) Dilution effects 
 In a typical call option arrangement with a share as the underlying asset, upon 
exercise of the option, the writer of the option (the one with the short position) delivers 
the share to the option holder. The writer must own the share, for example by having 
bought it in the market. 
 In an ESO arrangement, the writer of the option is the entity itself, therefore when 
the employee exercise the rights, the entity must issue new shares (or use treasury shares 
or shares previously repurchased). This has an incremental effect on the number of shares 
outstanding, having a dilutive effect for the shareholders. 
 Additionally, the shares are issued at the exercise price and not the current market 
price. This “puts pressure” in the share price, possibly causing a decrease in its value. If the 
share price actually decreases, the employee who exercises the option makes a smaller 
gain than if he owned a similar traded option. 
 However, it is defended by some that the market anticipates this dilution effect so 
it is already reflected in the share price, avoiding the need to adjust the ESO valuation to 
incorporate it. 
  
 After considering all these factors, we can understand why the valuation of ESO 
must differ from the valuation of “plain-vanilla” call options. The main reason is that the 
former have several factors that tend to reduce their value when compared to the latter. 
Ikäheimo et al. (2006) used a unique data set of ESO11 to prove that this particular kind of 
call options have a lower value than their valuation under a traditional option pricing 
model (the Black and Scholes). Their research concluded that the value of the options in 
their sample was 14,8% lower than the value provided by this model. 
                                                             
11
 In Finland, the ESOs can be traded at the Helsinki Stock Exchange. This allowed the researchers to 
have access to the market valuation of the options and compare it to their Black and Scholes’ value.  
















































This proven difference enforces the need for adjusting the option pricing models to 
incorporate in the estimation of the fair value of employee stock options their 
particularities. The guidelines of IFRS 2 on how to do so are discussed in the sub-section 
III. e) How does IFRS 2 account for employee share options and its specificities? 
III. d) Option-pricing models 
Given that there are virtually no traded options that mirror the terms included in a 
share option granted to employees, IFRS 2 requires the fair value of the options to be 
estimated using an option pricing-model. According to IFRS 2.B5, “the entity shall consider 
the factors that knowledgeable willing market participants would consider in selecting the 
option pricing models to apply”. 
The IASB does not require the use of a specific pricing-model. The only guideline 
given is that the model must take into account the factors referred in III. b), as all 
recognised option-pricing models do. In IFRS 2, both the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) and 
the binomial model are referred to as examples of acceptable models. 
We will, therefore, focus on the two most common option-pricing methodologies 
used: 
 the Black-Scholes-Merton formula; and 
 the binomial model (included in the general Lattice models). 
i) Black-Scholes-Merton  
 The Black-Scholes-Merton formula is commonly used to assess the value of traded 
options. This model is computed for a European call option, although the majority of ESO 
are American options. American options on dividend-paying shares generally have a 
greater value than European options on the same share, since the holder of the option can 
decide the timing of exercise. 
 BSM is a “closed-model”, since it produces a single valuation at one point in time 
from an equation, with no ability to change some assumptions during the life of the option. 
The original model developed by Black and Scholes was not suitable for a dividend paying 
share, but, with Merton, adjustments were made to the model and the one presented in 
Exhibit 1 considers a constant dividend yield throughout the life of the option. 
Although the application of the formula is quite easy, it is difficult to incorporate some 
specificities of employee share options in the calculations. Volatility, interest rates, 
dividend yield and share price are assumed as constant throughout the life of the option, 
which is less appropriate for a long-term option, such as an ESO, than for short-term 
options. Another issue is the fact that the formula assumes a fixed maturity date and, as 
















































previously discussed, ESO tend to be exercised before the maturity of the option. Thus, the 
T factor does not adequately describe exercise behaviour. The fixed exercise date of the 
formula also precludes the possibility of incorporating the blackout periods on the value 
computation. Last but not least, the BSM also does not allow for the consideration of 
vesting conditions. 
 This model presents several limitations at a first glance, but it can actually be 
adjusted to incorporate expected early exercise (as further explained in III. e)). Although it 
cannot incorporate changes in the parameters throughout the life of the option or 
incorporate blackout periods, the prediction of these factors is of extreme difficulty and is 
typically not done. In the end, most companies do not have enough information to be able 
to benefit from the use more complex models, therefore ending up using the BSM.  
ii) Binomial model 
The binomial model is one of the Lattice models, which value financial instruments 
through a flexible and iterative approach. According to Ernst & Young (2012), “a binomial 
model produces an estimated fair value based on the assumed changes in prices of a 
financial instrument over successive periods of time”. The model assumes that at least two 
price movements are possible in each time period. 
The underlying concepts of the binomial model and the BSM model are the same, 
but the main difference is that the binomial model is more flexible because it can use 
dynamic assumptions, such as the volatility, dividend yield and interest rates, which can 
be adjusted throughout time. Further details can be included in the lattice models so that it 
is more suitable to value an employee stock option, such as the likelihood of early exercise 
increasing with the increase in the option intrinsic value. 
Another issue that the binomial model can incorporate is the existence of market 
conditions, such as a requirement that the option can only be exercised if the price of the 
underlying shares reaches a certain quote. This is a feature that generally cannot be 
computed into the BSM model. 
The binomial model is implemented by the construction of a “tree” where the 
branches represent alternative future share price movements. Each branch represents a 
time period. The probability of the underlying share going up or down by a certain amount 
is computed, taking into consideration the same inputs as the BSM model. 
The ability to depict a significant number of possible future share prices over the 
life of the option is one of the advantages of a Lattice model. Additionally, a significant 
advantage of the model is that it is suitable for the “American” feature of ESO.  
















































Although these models can incorporate the specificities of employee share options, 
typically the entities lack the necessary data and forecasts to be able to profit from its 
advantages. For example, the fact that the inputs can be adjusted throughout time is a 
benefit of the model, but commonly, at the grant date, firms cannot predict the evolution of 
the inputs during the period until maturity. 
III. e) How does IFRS 2 account for employee share options and its 
specificities? 
After understanding how the fair value of employee share options can be determined, 
it is essential to know what are the requirements established by IFRS 2 and how this 
standard suggests that the pricing models be adjusted in order to accommodate the 
specificities of ESO. 
i) General guidelines 
Employee stock options are equity settled share-based payment transactions, as 
discussed in II. i). According to IFRS 2, the entity must recognise this type of transaction as 
the services are received by recognising an expense and the corresponding increase in 
equity (IFRS 2.7-8). The recognition of an expense, instead of an asset, occurs because the 
type of service provided by employees does not qualify as an asset. 
 The fair value of the services provided by employees should be measured at the 
grant date12 by reference to the fair value of the equity instruments granted, given the 
difficulties to measure accurately the value of the services received (IFRS 2.11-12). 
 Most share options granted are subject to vesting conditions and to a related 
vesting period. Whenever this period exists, an entity must account for the services 
rendered during the vesting period, for example “If an employee is granted share options 
conditional upon completing three years’ service, then the entity shall presume that the 
services to be rendered by the employee as consideration for the share options will be 
received in the future, over that three-year vesting period” [IFRS 2.15.a)]. 
 If the vesting condition is a performance condition and there is no specified period 
of completion of that condition, the entity must, at the grant date, estimate an expected 
vesting period, based on the most likely outcome of the performance condition (IFRS 
2.15.b)). 
                                                             
12
 Grant date – “The date at which the entity and another party (including an employee) agree to a 
share-based payment arrangement, being when the entity and the counterparty have a shared 
understanding of the terms and conditions of the arrangement. At grant date the entity confers on 
the counterparty the right to cash, other assets, or equity instruments of the entity, provided the 
specified vesting conditions are met. “ [IFRS 2.A] 
















































 When there are neither vesting conditions, nor vesting period, the entity must 
recognise the full amount of the expense at the grant date (IFRS 2.14), although this is 
typically not the case for employee share options. 
 Whenever the fair value of the equity instruments granted can be measured 
reliably, the entity must use a valuation technique that is “consistent with generally 
accepted valuation methodologies for pricing financial instruments, and shall incorporate 
all factors and assumptions that knowledgeable, willing market participants would 
consider in setting the price” [IFRS 2.17], as previously mentioned. The entity must 
disclose the model used, the inputs and the assumptions made to measure the fair value of 
the ESO. 
 Between the grant and the vesting date, i.e. during the expense allocation period, 
the entity can adjust the annual amount expense to reflect changes in forfeiture behaviour. 
On the vesting date, the amount of ESO estimated to be outstanding must be revised to 
reflect the number of ESO that actually vested (IFRS 2.20). 
However, after the vesting date the entity must not make any subsequent 
adjustment to the amount considered as the fair value (IFRS 2.23) or to the associated 
expense, except if the terms under which the ESO were granted are modified. If so, the 
entity must recognise these changes in case they lead to an increase of the total fair value 
of the transaction or are beneficial to the employee (IFRS B.42). Otherwise, i.e. if the 
modification reduces the total fair value, the entity must account for the services provided 
by the employees as if the modification had not occurred (IFRS B.44). 
 
 These are the general rules that apply to the measurement and recognition of ESO. 
Now, we will discuss how IFRS 2 allows the incorporation of the specificities of this 
remuneration method on the calculation of the amount to be expensed by the entities, by 
looking at the features that were previously discussed and for which this standard 
provides guidelines. 
ii) Vesting conditions 
 IFRS 2 states that vesting conditions, other than market conditions, should not be 
considered directly when measuring the fair value of a share option. The consideration of 
the vesting conditions should be made when calculating the total amount to be expensed, 
through the adjustment of the number of equity instruments included in the measurement 
of the transaction. This implies that the amount recognised (representing the goods or 
services received) must reflect the equity instruments that will eventually vest. 
















































 The estimation of the number of equity instruments should be “the best estimate” 
and it should be revised whenever subsequent information indicates that the number is 
different from the previous estimate (IFRS 2.20). 
 Usually, entities estimate a forfeiture probability (probability of the share options 
not vesting) based on the observation of previous share options issues of the same 
company under similar conditions. With this rate, the cumulative amount to be expensed 
is: 
fair value of one ESO x (1- forfeiture rate) x number of ESO granted 
(in a simplistic situation where all ESO contracts were similar and, thus, were priced at the 
same amount). 
 If the vesting conditions are market-based, they should be considered when 
estimating the fair value of the share option (IFRS 2.21). However, IFRS 2 does not provide 
any specific guidelines on how to account for these conditions. It may require more 
sophisticated models, for example the use of the binomial model where a minimum return 
on the share is required for exercisability (as discussed in III. e)). 
iii) Blackout periods 
 If the model used considers that the option can be exercised at any time during its 
life, the blackout periods must be taken into account. Otherwise, no adjustment is 
required. (IFRS 2.B8) 
Comments: 
 Although IFRS 2 suggest that this should be taken into account, there are no 
guidelines on how to do it. A possible way to do it when using the binomial model is to 
consider some dates as moments when the option cannot be exercised (even if it is in-the-
money). However, not only is it difficult to incorporate such detail in the computation of 
the fair value, but also there are several situations that can lead to blackout periods that 
cannot be predicted at the grant date (for example an acquisition announcement that was 
not planned at the grant date).  
iv) Specific inputs to ESO pricing models 
 Expected early exercise (IFRS 2.B16-B.21) 
The issue of early exercise was already discussed in previous sections. IFRS 2 adds 
other possibilities for this phenomenon: lack of wealth diversification and risk 
aversion. 
The way of taking this factor into account depends on the model used. In the BSM 
Model, the input “time to maturity” can be replaced by an expected life of the 
option (period between grant date and the expected exercise date of the option). 
















































Early exercise can also be factored into the more flexible models, such as the 
binomial. 
When estimating the expected life of the option, the entities must consider factors 
such as:  
o the length of the vesting period, since the options are only exercisable after 
this period ends; 
o similar options exercise patterns; 
o the price of the underlying shares; 
o the employee’s seniority level within the organisation; 
o  expected volatility of the underlying shares, since employees tend to 
exercise their right earlier when shares are more volatile; 
Comments:  
 The employee’s level within the organisation is believed to affect the exercise 
behaviour due to factors like liquidity needs and risk aversion (employees are expected to 
have lower liquidity needs and be less risk averse, the higher their level within the 
organisation, according to Huddart and Lang, 1996). An additional factor that is pointed 
out by these authors is that high-level employees’ actions have more visibility, which “may 
limit their willingness to exercise options early for perceived loyalty issues”.  
The existence of a particular contractual term also affects the expected life, and we 
believe it should be considered when estimating this input. For example, most ESO 
contracts include a term stating that the options expire in the case of major changes in 
corporate structure, such as a merger. The expectations about such events condition the 
expected life of the option. 
Although the replacement of the input “time to maturity” by “expected life of the 
option” is an improvement, it still lacks reliability since empirical studies (Huddart and 
Lang, 1996) suggest that the early exercise is not condensed in a specific period and that it 
is difficult to extrapolate the mean exercise time from past grants. 
 Expected volatility 
When calculating the expected volatility of the return on the underlying share, it is 
important to consider (IFRS 2. B25): 
o Implied volatility from traded share options on the entity’s shares (or from 
other traded instruments such as convertible debt);  
o Historical volatility - It is usually measured for the same period as the 
expected life of the option (for example, if an ESO has 5 years of expected 
















































life, volatility will be measured based on the evolution of the share price 
over the last 5 years).  
o The length of time an entity’s shares have been publicly traded – Recently 
listed entities might have a high historical volatility compared to peer 
companies that have been listed longer. 
o Mean-reverting-tendency – There is a tendency of volatility to revert to its 
long term average, which may be an indication that expected future 
volatility is not in line with past volatility. 
o Appropriate and regular intervals for price observations – There should be 
consistency in the measurement of price observations, from period to 
period.  
Comments:  
Implied volatility reflects market expectations for future volatility, since it is 
extracted from traded share options. The difficulty of using the implied volatility as the 
expected volatility is that traded share options are typically short term and, thus, reflect a 
much shorter period than ESO. 
Using solely historical volatility is assuming that the past behaviour reflects the 
future share behaviour, which is not necessarily true, especially in situations where there 
were significant changes in the entity’s business and context. 
Although all the factors mentioned above are helpful and must be considered when 
estimating expected volatility of the shares, unfortunately there is no single right way to 
do it. Taking all of them into consideration will probably create a range of possible results, 
giving managers the ability to choose one justifiable value, which may or not be used to 
favour them.  
 Expected dividends (IFRS 2.B31-36) 
This should be factored into the option pricing model if the employees are not 
entitled to receive the dividends on the share options before the exercise, which is 
the most common situation. As previously discussed, the dividends reduce the 
value of the share option by the present value of the expected dividends at the 
grant date. The introduction of this factor can be made either through an expected 
dividend yield (dividend as percentage of share price) or through expected 
dividend payments. When using the latter, the entity must look at its historical 
patterns to estimate the dividend amount, when available (for example, some 
companies may be newly listed). 
 

















































An issue that is not referred to by the IASB in this standard is the fact that 
disclosing the expected dividend yield/amount for a period as long as the one in a share 
option contract (may reach 10 years, or even more) is disclosing more information to 
investors than entities usually do or may be entitled to do. The release of long term 
expectations on dividends may be seen as guidance and may create expectations on 
investors and raise concerns on the release of sensitive information. 
 Risk-free interest rate (IFRS 2.B37) 
The risk-free rate that must be used in the calculation of the Fair Value of an ESO is 
the implied yield currently available on the zero-coupon government issues of the 
country in whose currency the exercise price of the share option is expressed. The 
remaining term of this coupon issues must be equal to the expected life of the 
option under valuation. If such government issues do not exist, are not 
representative or are not typically considered by market participants, an 
appropriate substitute should be considered. 
v) Capital structure effects 
The dilutive effect of ESO on the capital structure is highlighted by IFRS 2.B41 as a 
factor to be considered when estimating the fair value at grant date. The significance of 
this effect depends on numerous factors (including the number of new shares issued upon 
exercise versus the current number of shares outstanding). The standard indicates that the 
entity must evaluate if the effect is significant and, if so, adapt option pricing models to 























IV. CASE STUDY 
IV. a) The Company – Nestlé 
Nestlé is a leading Swiss-based company operating in the Nutrition, Health and 
Wellness sectors, offering a wide range of products dispersed in several geographies. The 
company’s mission is “Good Food, Good Life”13 and its objectives are “to be recognized as 
the world leader in Nutrition, Health and Wellness, trusted by all its stakeholders, and to 
be the reference for financial performance in its industry”11. 
The company has a product portfolio ranging from baby food (with brands like Cerelac 
and Nestum), to cereals (Chocapic, Estrelitas), coffee (Nescafé, Nespresso) and even Pet 
Care (Friskies, Purina). For more details on the brand portfolio, please refer to Exhibit 2. 
Among these brands, there are global ones, but also local ones, adapted to the culture and 
tastes of a specific geography. For this local knowledge and proximity to consumers and 
suppliers, the company has established itself in almost every country in the world. In 
2011, its sales were geographically divided in three main areas: 24% in Asia, Oceania and 
Africa, 31% in Europe and 45% in the Americas. 
Nestlé S.A. has publicly traded shares, listed on the SIX Swiss Exchange, and the 
historical price evolution can be observed in Exhibit 3. In 2011, Nestlé recorded 
consolidated sales of CHF 83.642 million, 10,1% less than in the previous year. Trading 
Operating Profit reached CHF 12.538 million (-15,5%) and Net Income amounted to CHF 
9.804 million (-72,3%). In the table below, we can see the evolution of the main financial 
indicators. 
Table 2: Financial Indicators of Nestlé S.A. 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 






98.458 91.075 84.690 
Trading Oper. profit  
(in millions of CHF) 
12.538 14.832 15.699 15.676 15.024 13.302 11.720 10.760 
Net Income  
(in millions of CHF) 
9.804 35.384 11.793 19.051 11.382 9.849 8.518 7.031 
Basic EPS (in CHF) 2,97 10,16 2,92 4,87 2,78 2,37 2,06 1,70 
DPS (in CHF) 1,85 1,60 1,40 1,22 1,04 0,90 0,80 0,72 
DPR (%) 62,3% 15,7% 47,9% 25,1% 37,4% 38,0% 38,9% 42,4% 
Notes:  
- EPS - Earnings per Share; DPS - Dividends per Share; DPR - Dividend Payout Ratio; 
- Effective 30 June  2008 the company made a 1-for-10 stock split. For comparative analysis, the values were 
adjusted to reflect the stock split. 
Sources: Consolidated Financial Statements of the Nestlé Group (2011 to 2004) and Bloomberg 
 
                                                             
13
 Extracted from Nestlé’s corporate website (www.nestle.com), “About us” tab, visited in April 30, 
2012 



















 EBITDA has remained in the CHF 10.760-15.699 million range during the period in 
analysis (2004-2011). The Net Income figure presents higher volatility, mostly due to 
extraordinary items arising from Nestlé’s divestitures in some businesses, for example the 
sale of Alcon to Novartis in 201014. 
IV. b) Employee stock options in Nestlé  
Nestlé selects some groups of employees as eligible to receive equity compensation 
plans, as a long-term incentive. The firm has four different plans: 
 Management Stock Option Plan (MSOP) for members of the Executive Board (14 
members as of  31 December 2011; 
 Performance Share Unit Plan (PSUP) also for members of the Executive Board; 
 Restricted Stock Unit Plans (RSUP) for members of Group Management; and 
 Share Appreciation Rights (SAR) for members of Group Management, as well. 
Depending on the way they are settled, these plans can be either accounted for as 
equity-settled (by remittance of Nestlé S.A. shares) or as cash-settled share-based 
payment transactions (by the payment of an equivalent amount in cash). 
We will focus our attention in the MSOP, since it is the one that entitles the employees 
covered by this plan with employee share options. Once a year, it provides the awarded 
members of the Executive Board non-tradable options on Nestlé S.A. shares, giving them 
the right to purchase, at the exercise price, one Nestlé S.A. share for each option owned. 
The vesting period of the stock options is of three years after the grant date. Upon 
vesting, the options can be exercised for a period of four years, from the vesting date until 
the expiration date. 
In 2011, the total amount expensed under this plan (under continuing operations) was 
of CHF 9 million, an amount similar to the one registered in 2010. If we look at the overall 
cost of CHF 179 million registered in 2011 as share-based payment costs (both equity and 
cash settled transactions), we can conclude that this is not the most common form of 
rewarding the employees through share-based transactions, representing only 5% of the 
total cost. In Exhibit 4, we can find the cost of these transactions with more details.  
However, the amounts are certainly relevant for the Board’s executives that receive 
the compensation. In 2011 alone, Paul Bulcke, CEO of Nestlé, received 361 thousand stock 
options, valued at CHF 1 999 940, representing more than 20% of his total annual 
compensation. A total of 3,5 million stock options were held by Executive Board members 
of Nestlé in 2011, from different yearly grants. Nestlé believes this is one of the ways of 
                                                             
14 In 2010, Novartis exercised its call option to acquire the outstanding capital from Novartis that 
belonged to Nestlé. 



















“paying for performance” and to ensure “alignment with long-term company strategy and 
shareholder’s interest”. 
The table below is provided by Nestlé in their Annual Report, disclosing the evolution 
of the ESO during 2011 and 2010, looking both at the weighted average exercise price and 
at the number of options. 
Table 3: Management Stock Option Plan – Weighted average exercise price and the number of options 

















Outstanding at 1 January 42,16 8,3 35,37 15,4 
Granted 52,58 1,4 53,29 1,6 
Exercised 32,85 (1,8) 32,12 (8,7) 
Forfeited - - - - 
Outstanding at 31 December 46,25 7,9 42,16 8,3 
 Of which exercisable at 31 
December 
43,38 2,7 37,10 3,7 
Source:  Consolidated Financial Statements of the Nestlé Group 2011 – Note 11.2 
 
Focusing on 2011, we can see that although 1,4 million of options were granted, the 
number of outstanding options decreased since the beginning of the year, due to the 
amount of options exercised (1,8 millions). A factor that pops-out is the inexistence of 
options forfeited in both periods (at least when rounded to millions of units).  
Nestlé uses the Black-Scholes-Merton model to estimate the fair value of the options 
granted. At the grant date, 3 March 2011, the options granted had an estimated unit fair 
value of CHF 5,54. The inputs for the BSM formula considered by Nestlé can be accessed in 
the table below. 
Table 4 - Management Stock Option Plan – Inputs for the BSM assumed by Nestlé 
 2011 2010 
Market price of Nestlé S.A. shares (at the grant date) CHF 52,60 CHF 53,85 
Exercise price  CHF 52,58 CHF 53,29 
Expected volatility 18,42% 19,05% 
Expected dividend yield 3,52% 2,97% 
Risk-free interest rate 1,59% 1,54% 
Grant date 03/03/2011 05/03/2010 
Expiry date 02/03/2018 04/03/2017 
Source:  Consolidated Financial Statements of the Nestlé Group 2011 – Note 11.2 
 



















When issuing employee stock options for the MSOP, Nestlé S.A. defines the exercise 
price upon the average market price of its shares of the last ten trading days that precede 
the grant date. Just by looking at the exercise price of the options granted in both years, we 
can see that the share price close to the grant date in 2011 (3 March 2011) was slightly 
lower than the share price on the homologous period in 2010, suggesting that the price 
evolution from one year to the other was not significant. This can be confirmed by looking 
at Exhibit 3 – Nestlé S.A. share price evolution. 
The company does not provide all the contractual information about the ESO, such as 
details on the existence of vesting conditions or blackout periods. 
IV. c) ESO – alternative fair value estimations 
After having analysed the company and its stock option plan in more detail, we believe 
this detailed data can be used to support our discussion regarding the measurement of the 
fair value of employee stock option. Nestlé’s fair value estimations were done at the grant 
date (03.03.2011). To ensure comparability, our analysis will be made with reference to 
this same date.  
In this case study, we will question Nestlé’s assumptions and provide alternative 
pricings for the employee share options awarded under the MSOP plan, in 2011. As one of 
the main criticisms of fair value accounting is that in the absence of quoted prices, fair 
value measurement may be unreliable and subject to managerial discretion, our intention 
is to confirm whether the application of IFRS 2 may lead to numerous valid valuations for 
the same equity instruments and to analyse until what extent could Nestlé change its 
assumptions in order to reduce the recognised expense and to favour their executives. 
The first fair value estimation conducted was the replication of the estimation done by 
Nestlé, for one ESO, according to the inputs used by Nestlé and previously presented in 
Table 4. Our estimation is of CHF5,84, whereas the value presented by Nestlé is of 
CHF5,54.  Differences may arise from the input “expected life of the option”, because 
although Nestlé states the grant date and the expiry date of the ESOs, it is not clear if the 
entity assumes that the expected life of the option corresponds to the full 7-year period. 
From now on, this will be considered the “base-case” - the value of one ESO under Nestlé’s 
assumptions is of CHF5,84. 
Before going further with our analysis it is important to highlight that no adjustment 
was made to reflect a possible dilution effect, since the 1,4 million ESO granted by Nestlé 
(which if exercised correspond to the same number of new shares) were almost 
insignificant (0,05%) when compared to the 3.196 million shares outstanding in 2011 
(weighted average number of shares outstanding).  



















We will start by analysing each assumption separately to understand the impact of 
changing each input in the fair value estimations. 
i) Risk-free rate  
 Nestlé considered a risk-free rate of 1,59% as an input for the calculation of the fair 
value of the ESO. According to IFRS 2, the advised reference is to consider the risk-free 
rate as the yield to maturity of the government zero-coupon bonds from Switzerland 
(since the currency of the exercise price of the options is the Swiss official currency: Swiss 
Francs - CHF). The figure considered by Nestlé is, in fact, in line with the yield of a Swiss 
Government bond with 7-year maturity as of the 3 March 2011 (1,544%)15. The bond issue 
considered is not a zero-coupon bond (there were no outstanding Swiss Government zero-
coupon bonds), but we believe this is a valid approximation. 
 IFRS 2 suggests that the risk-free rate can also be considered with reference to 
another country’s zero-coupon bonds, if the market participants typically determine the 
risk-free rate with reference to this other country. In Europe, most financial users consider 
the German bonds (Bunds) as representative of a risk-free investment. Nestlé could 
consider this rate (3,053%)16 as the risk-free rate, which could be supported by the fact 
that 31% of their sales in 2011 were in Europe and the Bunds are considered as the 
reference of a European risk-free investment.  
We believe it is more valid to consider the Swiss Government bonds as the 
reference for the risk-free rate because, although there are no zero-coupon bond issue by 
this Government, the underlying share of these options and their exercise price are quoted 
in Swiss Francs. 
The table below presents the yield from Swiss Government bonds, with 4 to 7 year 
maturities. These values will be useful later, when we consider different expected life of 
the options and, thus, will have to adjust the associated risk-free rate. 
Table 4 – Yield of Swiss Government Bonds with different maturities 
Maturity (as of 03.03.2011) Yield 
4 years 1,112% 
5 years 1,346% 
6 years 1,457% 
7 years 1,544% 
Source: Bloomberg 
                                                             
15
 Data Source: Bloomberg. The yield presented was registered at 03.03.2011 for a Swiss 
Government bond issue with maturity in 08.01.2018. 
16 Data Source: Bloomberg. The yield presented was registered at 03.03.2011 for a German zero-
coupon Government bond with maturity in 04.01.2018. 



















 The estimation of the fair value of one employee share option of Nestlé granted in 
March is of CHF5,79, if we consider all inputs equal to the company’s assumption, except 
the risk-free rate which we considered to be 1,544%.  As expected, this value is only 
slightly lower (-0,8%) than the base-case (CHF5,84) given the small difference between 
the risk-free considered by Nestlé and our estimation of the same input.    
ii) Expected volatility 
 When forecasting expected volatility, Nestlé based its estimation on historical 
volatility of the market price of its S.A. shares and made adjustments “for any expected 
changes to future volatility to publicly available information”. The company did not 
provide any further information about the volatility estimation, such as the time frame 
under which it calculated the volatility or more details on the “expected changes” that led 
to the adjustments. 
 However, as we know, it is almost impossible to be accurate in these predictions. 
Future volatility does not necessarily reflect historical volatility; implied volatility reflects 
market expectations; and several factors and unknowns can “ruin” our estimation. 
 As alternatives, we present values for expected volatility based on: 
 Historical annualised volatility of the return of Nestlé S.A. shares from a period of 7 
years (equal to the expected life of the option considered by Nestlé) before the 
grant date. It was measured by looking at daily closing prices of the share. 
Although Nestlé also used historical volatility, the data that we are providing was 
not adjusted to any “expected changes”. The value ascends to 19,21%, which 
compares with 18.42% assumed by Nestlé. 
When looking at the historical volatility calculated based on the average daily 
returns of the share during a period as long as the expected life of the option, we 
should consider on whether there were unusual events that could have affected 
the results. Overall, Nestlé is a diversified group, operating in a non-cyclical sector 
and its shares are liquid, which reduces the impact of environmental events in the 
shares volatility. However, the instability that has been felt in financial markets 
since the beginning of the crisis in 2008 can be considered has an unusual effect. 
This is a possible reason for the higher historical volatility observed in the last 4 
years, when compared to the last 7 years (please refer to Exhibit 5). 
 Implied volatility of an American call option with Nestlé S.A. share as underlying 
(18,78%) – This estimation is based on the value of the NESN SW 12/15 C52 and 



















was computed by Bloomberg17 as of 10 May 2012. The measurement of the 
implied volatility presented several difficulties:  there were no available traded 
options with a maturity as long as the expected life of the ESO or with the same 
strike, so the option with the longest maturity and the closest strike price was 
considered (18 December 2015 and CHF52, respectively); the estimation was done 
in May, 2012, instead of at the grant date, given the inability to do the calculation 
with reference to the grant date; the traded call option is not liquid, presenting a 
big difference from its bid and ask price18 and few variations on the open interest. 
All these difficulties in the measurement question the validity of the estimation. 
After having searched for alternatives for the forecast of expected volatility, we believe 
Nestlé made a valid choice when estimating this input with reference to the historical 
figures, given the lack of reliable alternatives available. 
We estimated the fair value of an employee stock option of Nestlé granted in March, 
2011 by replacing the expected volatility considered by the entity (18,42%) for our 
estimation of volatility (19,21%). The value achieved was of CHF6,18, representing an 
increase of 5,9% from the base-case. We can see that the value of this option is extremely 
sensitive for a change in the volatility input. 
The estimations of the historical volatility of Nestlé for the different expected lives that 
will be considered further on are presented and commented in Exhibit 5. 
 
iii) Expected dividends 
 The expected dividend yield assumed by Nestlé for this grant of options is in line 
with the dividend yield observed in 2012, of 3,5%, with reference to the results of 2011. 
To estimate expected dividends, we will start by analysing the historical trends of 
two dividend measures, to identify which one of them guides Nestlé’s annual dividend 
decision. For this we can see in the graph below the evolution of the Dividend per Share 
(DPS) and the Dividend Pay-out Ratio (DPR). 
                                                             
17 For this computation, Bloomberg had to assume the remaining inputs of the option: dividends 
until expiration were assumed to be of CHF6,75 and a risk-free rate of 0,28%. 
18 The bid price was of CHF 6,35 and the ask price of CHF 7,61. 




















Figure 1: Comparison of the evolution of the Dividend Pay-out Ratio and the Dividend per Share 
 
In Exhibit 6, we also look at the evolution of the dividend yield, since Nestlé 
established a dividend yield as an input for the estimation of the fair value of the ESOs 
granted in 201119.  Focusing on the Dividend per Share, we can see a clearly upward trend, 
which slowed down in 2011. Both the Dividend Pay-out Ratio and the dividend yield do 
not show a clear path. This suggests that the firm, when deciding the dividend amount to 
be paid to shareholders, focuses on increasing the DPS, instead of setting the amount 
based on a desired pay-out ratio or dividend yield. 
Due to this, we will use a model that incorporates the present value of the DPS, 
instead of taking dividend yield as an input. A possible explanation for the fact that the 
entity uses a model that incorporates the dividend yield and not the present value of DPS 
is that the use of the former would create clear expectations on the investors, since Nestlé 
would have to disclose the exact amount that it intended to pay as dividends during the 
expected life of the option. If the firm provides a dividend yield, there are still expectations 
created about the dividend, but since the share price in the future is not known, it is less 
clear. 
 We will use the adapted version of the BSM that incorporates the present value of 
the dividends (formula in Exhibit 7) for three mains reasons. First, from the analysis of the 
trends previously observed, we believe Nestlé makes its dividends decision based on the 
DPS. Second, in general, entities do not focus on the dividend yield, since they do not 
control the share price - they focus on the DPS and/or on the DPR, since these are 
variables under their control, which do not depend on the market’s appreciation of the 
                                                             
19
 The Dividend Payout Ratio was calculated based on the basic Earnings per Share. The dividend 
yield was calculated by considering the closing price on the last day of the year. 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
DPR 47,1% 43,7% 43,9% 43,9% 28,7% 54,8% 18,2% 65,7%
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company. Third, we believe it makes more sense to forecast the DPS than to forecast the 
dividend yield, since we cannot forecast with reliability the future share price. 
Since the analysis is conducted in 2012, the value of dividends that refers to 2011 
(already announced: DPS of CHF1,95) will be considered as a given data. To forecast future 
dividends two scenarios will be considered: one that assumes an annual growth of 13,6% 
(the average annual growth of DPS from 2004 to 2011) and a “worst-case-scenario” that 
assumes an annual growth of 5,4% (the annual growth registered from 2010 to 2011). In 
Exhibit 8, the forecasts and the present value of dividends for the different expected lives 
considered are presented. 
For the expected life considered by Nestlé (7 years), we forecast that the amount to 
be paid in dividends in an “average scenario” has a present value of CHF19,31 and the 
respective amount for a “worst-case scenario” is of CHF15,07, leading to a fair value 
estimation for one ESO of CHF6,29 (+7,7% than the base-case) and CHF7,13 (+22,2%), 
respectively.  
iv) Expected life of the option 
There is no available information on the average life of an ESO under the MSOP of 
Nestlé. However, for all the reasons previously discussed in chapter III. c), we believe that 
the majority of these options will be exercised before maturity, thus having an expected 
life shorter than the time to maturity of the option, in this case 7 years. The only certainty 
is that the expected life of the option will be longer than the vesting period (3 years) and 
shorter than the time to maturity (7 years).  
A factor that we can consider is that although early exercise is expected, all the 
employees involved in this plan are high-level employees (executives), which are believed 
to exercise their rights not as early as lower-level employees (Huddart and Lang, 1996). 
Still, since empirical studies could not define a typical exercise behaviour, not even by 
looking at previous grants of the same company (Huddart and Lang, 1996), there is no 
guideline for estimating expected life in this case. 
It could be advantageous to consider different sets of options within the total 
options granted. For example if a specific option-holder had an observable typical exercise 
behaviour, the expected life of the options held by him/her could be estimated with more 
reliability and could be different from the remaining options. However, there is not 
enough available information to differentiate between options from the same grant. 
To provide alternative calculations of the fair value, we will consider three 
additional scenarios for the expected life of the options: 4 years, 5 years and 6 years. We 
do not consider the extreme situation of the expected life equalling the vesting period (3 



















years), because although some ESOs may be immediately exercised, the expected life 
should reflect the entire set of options granted and we do not believe all options will be 
exercised immediately after vesting. 
It is important to recall that the remaining inputs (risk-free rate, expected volatility 
and expected dividends) are dependent on the expected life of the option and must be 
adjusted for the time frame considered by the expected life. So, we provide alternative 
valuations by changing the expected life of the option to 4, 5 and 6 years and we adjust 
both the risk-free rate and the expected volatility for the same time frame, according to the 
values previously discussed and presented in Table 4 and in Exhibit 5, respectively. Since 
Nestlé considered a dividend yield instead of forecasting the Dividend per Share, there is 
no necessity to adjust the expected dividend input. 
The estimated fair value for one ESO with 4, 5 and 6 years maturity is, respectively, 
of CHF6,44 (+10% than the base-case), CHF6,38 (+9,3%) and CHF6,15 (5,41%). As 
previously discussed in III.b), the lower the time to expiration, the lower the option value. 
In this analysis this is not the case because although the risk free adjustment goes in the 
same direction (a lower time to expiration is associated to a lower risk-free rate, and thus 
a lower option value), the volatility adjustment increased the option value. This is due to 
the fact that historical volatility was higher in the last years close to the grant date, so 
when adjusting the expected volatility with reference to the historical volatility calculated 
(please refer to Exhibit 5), the value of the option increased. If we had considered the 
estimation done by Nestlé for the expected volatility (18,42%) for the different expected 
lives, the estimated fair value for one ESO with 4, 5 and 6 years maturity would have been, 
respectively, of CHF4,95 (-15,2% than the base-case), CHF5,34 (-8,4%) and CHF5,60 (-
4,1%).  
v) Additional Alternative Valuations 
 After having questioned the assumptions made by Nestlé to estimate the fair value 
of the ESOs granted in 2011 and having provided ten alternative valuations, it is possible 
to provide additional valuations by changing more than one assumption at a time, as 
presented in the table below. 
Table 5: Additional Alternative Valuations 
a) Expected life of 7 years, risk-free rate of 1,59% (as assumed by the company) and expected volatility of 
19,21% (our historical estimate). 
Expected dividends FV of one ESO (in CHF) % change from base case 
Average growth scenario 6,73 +15,2% 
“Worst-case” scenario 7,57 +29,7% 
 



















b) Expected life of 7 years and risk-free rate of 1,544% (yield of a 7Y Swiss-Government bond). 
Expected 
dividends 
FV of one ESO (in CHF) 
w/ company’s 




FV of one ESO (in 
CHF) w/ historical 








6,26 +7,2% 6,70 +14,7% 
“Worst-case” 
scenario 
7,09 +21,6% 7,53 +29,1% 
 
 
c) Expected life of 6 years and risk-free rate of 1,457% (yield of a 6Y Swiss-Government bond). 
Expected 
dividends 
FV of one ESO (in CHF) 
w/ company’s 




FV of one ESO (in 
CHF) w/ historical 








5,99 +2,6% 6,79 +16,3% 
“Worst-case” 
scenario 
6,65 +14,0% 7,46 +27,8% 
 
 
d) Expected life of 5 years and risk-free rate of 1,346% (yield of a 5Y Swiss-Government bond). 
Expected 
dividends 
FV of one ESO (in CHF) 
w/ company’s estimate 




FV of one ESO (in 
CHF) w/ historical 








5,68 -2,6% 6,92 +18,5% 
“Worst-case” 
scenario 

























e) Expected life of 4 years and risk-free rate of 1,112% (yield of a 4Y Swiss-Government bond). 
Expected 
dividends 
FV of one ESO (in CHF) 
w/ company’s estimate 




FV of one ESO (in 
CHF) w/ historical 








5,25 -10,1% 6,96 +19,3% 
“Worst-case” 
scenario 
5,55 -4,9% 7,27 +24,5% 
 
IV. d) Discussion 
i) Analysis of main results 
 The first factor that we believe is striking is that by questioning the four 
controllable model inputs, we were able to provide 28 valid alternative valuations for the 
same employee share option. If we had considered the implied volatility as a valid 
estimation of the expected volatility and the German Bunds as a valid reference for the 
risk-free rate, the number of alternative values would have been even higher. This is in 
line with the main criticisms against fair value accounting – there is a significant degree of 
uncertainty when measuring fair value in the absence of quoted prices. 
The provided alternative valuations are comprised in an interval from CHF4,95 to 
CHF7,57, with an average of CHF6,44 and a median of CHF6,41, representing a change 
from the base case from -15% to 30%. When considering the total number of ESOs granted 
in 2011 (1,4 millions), Nestlé could have registered an expense under their MSOP plan 
between CHF6,93 million and CHF10,6 million. In fact, Nestlé registered an expense under 
this plan of CHF9 million. However, only CHF 7,756 million20 corresponded to the ESO 
granted in 20111 and the remaining amount was probably related with adjustments made 
to grants provided in previous years. 
 Now focusing on the results itself, it is remarkable that only 7 of the alternative 
valuations provided were lower than the base-case, as can be confirmed in the histogram 
below. When comparing with the fair value of one ESO provided by Nestlé (CHF5,54), only 
3 valuations fall behind this value. 
                                                             
20 Nestlé granted 1,4 million employee share options and valued each at CHF5,54, resulting on an 
expense of 7,756M. 




















Figure 2: Histogram – Alternative Valuations 
Being the valuation of employee stock options a clear occasion where managers 
can exercise some discretion over the inputs of the models, it seems that Nestlé used 
discretion to provide a lower fair value valuation. This is in line with common wisdom and 
empirical research (including Aboody et al., 2006) which suggest that managers have an 
opportunistic behaviour when selecting the model inputs towards reducing the value and, 
consequently, reporting a lower expense.  
 Hodder et al. (2006) suggest that the entities’ use of discretion is driven by either 
opportunistic motivation or informational motivational. If opportunistic motivation 
prevails, firms tend to understate stock based compensation. Two possible incentives for 
opportunistic behaviour are highlighted by Aboody et al. (2006): firms understate fair 
value expense so that they improve perceived firm’s profitability by investors; and it may 
be an executives’ attempt to reduce the perceived compensation, which is typically 
considered excessive. On the other hand, firms which “overestimate ESO fair values 
appear to convey information about future operating risk” (Hodder et al., 2006). The latter 
researchers consider that when informational motivation prevails, managers reflect 
private information on their estimations, for example to “convey information about future 
volatility and/or dividends”. 
 According to our analysis, Nestlé’s behaviour is mostly driven by opportunistic 
motivation, since the firm understated its share-based compensation. However, Aboody et 
al. (2006) conclude that firms with a low magnitude of ESO when compared to the number 
of shares outstanding and with strong corporate governance have less incentive to incur in 
opportunistic behaviour, thus reducing the incentives to minimise share-based 
compensation expense. Since Nestlé’s ESO represent only 0,05% of the total shares 
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the Best Corporate Governance in Switzerland by the World Finance Magazine, we would 
expect the company to have less incentives to incur in this behaviour.  
ii) Case Study Limitations 
 The main limitations of this case study arise from the lack of private information 
from Nestlé. Contrarily to what happens when Nestlé makes its fair value estimations, we 
only relied on public available information.  
 This limits our ability to incorporate relevant information such as expectations 
about future events that may affect the inputs. For example the fact that Nestlé S.A. is 
acquiring Pfizer’s infant-nutrition unit (announced in April, 2012) or expectations about 
other potential acquisitions (or even divestitures) could have been reflected in inputs. 
Typically, such events increase share volatility and they may even lead to changes in the 
board structure, which could force some members to exercise their options earlier than 
expected, reducing the expected life of the option. This sort of events may also result in 
blackout periods, which, as previously discussed in section III. c) iv), reduce the value of 
the employee share options, although their incorporation in the valuation is particularly 
difficult. 
 However, our assumptions are in line with what is typically considered by analysts, 
such as the forecast of a dividend per share instead of forecasting the dividend yield. 
Additional considerations, including the use of an expected life of the option, to reflect 
early exercise, instead of its total time to maturity, are supported by academic literature. 
Therefore, we believe the alternative assumptions presented are sound and allow us to 
achieve a reliable measurement of the fair value of Nestlé’s employee share options. 
 The choice of the Black-Scholes-Merton as the option pricing model may be also 
perceived as a limitation of our case study, since the Binomial model is considered more 
suitable to incorporate the specificities of ESO (discussed in section III. d)). However, 
given the lack of detailed information about the grant, we considered that the added value 
of using the Binomial would not compensate the increased complexity of the analysis. 
Using the BSM model is also a valid choice, since it is one of the models suggested by IFRS 
2 and Nestlé also used it, allowing us to make a more direct value comparison. 
 The existence of a forfeiture rate, which would affect the total amount expensed by 
Nestlé, was also excluded from this analysis. With data from previous financial statements 
of Nestlé S.A., we were able to calculate an annual forfeiture rate21, presented in Exhibit 9. 
Historically, the forfeiture rate in Nestlé was always under 2%, during the period in 
analysis, and the average rate was 0,54%. However, the data provided by the company 
                                                             
21
 Forfeiture rate = options forfeited/options outstanding 



















does not allow us to know to which grant do the forfeited options belong. Given the lack of 
detailed information to identify a clear trend in the forfeiture behaviour, the forfeiture was 
not considered in this analysis. 
  





















 After having analysed in detail IFRS 2 – Share-based Payment and having applied 
its guidelines to a specific case (Nestlé’s employee’s stock option granted in 2011 under 
the MSOP plan) we recognise that the estimation of the fair value of employee stock 
options is a process that presents several difficulties and that, as other fair value 
estimations where market prices are unavailable, is not as accurate as desirable, leaving 
room for the managers to exercise discretion over the model inputs. 
 However, we also recognise that measuring this compensation form based on its 
fair value is the best option available. Given the characteristics of this share-based 
payment, the most common alternative to fair value measurement – historical cost – is not 
an option, as we cannot reliably quantify the services provided by the employees that give 
rise to this share-based payment. 
The use of the intrinsic value as a measurement alternative is not desirable as well, 
since its use does not truly reflect the cost that this remuneration form represents to the 
company. In most cases, it would translate into a nil or marginal amount (as the strike 
price is usually in line with the market price at the time of the grant), hampering the 
expensing principle. 
It is also important to bear in mind that whether or not to recognise employee 
stock options at its fair value is not only a matter of the reported expenses and its effect on 
the entities’ earnings. The fair value amount recognised is particularly relevant for 
Corporate Governance matters, since employee stock options can be a significant portion 
of an Executive’s remuneration package that are now truly reflected in the accounts. 
Nestlé’s case study allowed us to understand in detail the difficulties that the 
entities face when estimating ESO’s fair value – option pricing models are not fully 
adapted for this specific type of call options, most inputs do not have a single right way of 
being calculated, and the specificities subjacent to these options provide additional 
difficulties. 
In our analysis, we provided 28 alternative fair value estimations for the same ESO 
grant, and the results suggested that Nestlé exercised managerial discretion over the 
model inputs, understating the amount expensed. Possible reasons for this opportunistic 
behaviour are that Nestlé wanted to improve its perceived profitability and to reduce the 
perceived executives’ remuneration. However, according to Aboody’s et al. (2006) 
research, we would expect Nestlé to have less incentives to understate its ESO expense 
than other companies in which the corporate governance is weaker and where the amount 




















of stock options awarded has a higher magnitude when compared to the total amount of 
shares outstanding. 
 
To conclude, fair value measurement of employee stock options presents pros and 
cons, as does the fair value measurement of other items. It allows investors and financial 
statements’ users to have more valuable information, since it reflects the cost for the 
company of incurring in such share-based payment and also provides additional 
information about the executives’ remuneration, an issue at which the world is looking 
more closely and that has Corporate Governance implications. However, since the fair 
value measurement of ESO does not rely on market-based figures’ but on option pricing 
models, it is not as reliable as desirable and it leaves room for managers to exercise 
discretion over the amount expensed. 
To reduce the power of the criticisms raised against IFRS 2 and in line with the 
IASB’s objectives to improve transparency and quality of the information provided, we 
recommend that the entities provide additional disclosures: 
 Consistent with the suggestions of Hodder et al. (2006), entities could explain in 
more detail the reported inputs, by reporting historical experience and industry 
benchmarks and by explaining why their estimations differ from these references;  
 Currently, firms disclose the total number and the weighted average exercise price 
of options outstanding, cancelled and exercised each year, on an aggregated 
matter. If firms disclosed these numbers on a grant-by-grant basis, providing 
additional details on the time to maturity, it would allow the users of financial 
statements to make better estimations of the option costs. This is in line with 
suggestions made by Huddart and Lang (1996); and, 
 Entities could disclose a range of values under which they believe the fair value of 
the ESO grant is comprised, by considering several valid inputs, and defend why 
they believe the reported value is the best estimation. This would provide the 
readers of financial statements with a more detailed analysis of the estimation and, 
thus, it would improve their ability to make valid judgements about the amount 
recognised. 
  



















Exhibit 1 – Black-Scholes-Merton formula 
      
    (  )    
    (  ) 
Where: 
   





       √  
c = Theoretical value of a call option 
S0 = Price of the underlying share 
N = Cumulative standard normal distribution 
q = Dividend yield (continuously compounded) 
K = Exercise/ Strike price 
r = Risk-free rate (continuously compounded) 
σ = Standard deviation of the return on the underlying share (annualised) 




































Exhibit 2 – Nestlé’s Brand Portfolio 
Sector Brand 
Baby foods Cereleac, Gerber, Gerber Graduates, NaturNes, Nestum 
Bottled water Nestlé Pure Life, Perrier, Poland Spring, S. Pellegrino 
Cereals Chocapic, Cini Minis, Cookie Crisp, Estrelitas, Fitness, 
Nesquik Cereal 
Chocolate & confectionery Aero, Butterfinger, Cailler, Crunch, Kit Kat, Orion, 
Smarties, Wonka 
Coffee Nescafé, Nescafé 3 in 1, Nescafé Cappuccino, Nescafé 
Classic, Nescafé Decaff, Nescafé Dolce Gusto, Nescafé 
Gold, Nespresso 
Culinary, chilled and frozen 
food 
Buitoni, Herta, Hot Pockets, Lean Cuisine, Maggi,  
Stouffer’s, Thomy 
Dairy Carnation, Coffee-Mate, La Laitière, Nido 
Drinks Juicy Juice, Milo, Nesquik, Nestea 
Food servisse Chef, Chef-Mate, Lean Cuisine, Maggi, Milo, Minor’s, 
Nescafé, Nestea, Sjora , Stouffer’s 
Healthcare nutrition Boost, Nutren Junior, Peptamen, Resource 
Ice cream Extrême, Häagen-Dazs, Mövenpick; Nestlé Ice Cream 
Petcare Alpo, Bakers Complete, Beneful, Cat Chow, Chef 
Michael’s Canine  Creations, Dog Chow, Fancy Feast, 
Feliz, Friskies, Gourmet Purina, Purina ONE Pro Plan 
Sports nutrition PowerBar 
Weigth management Jenny Craig 
Source: Nestlé’s Corporate Website – “About Us” 
 











Nestlé S.A. shares - Daily closing price 
Last Price


















Exhibit 4 – Equity Compensation Plans – Amount expensed 
In Millions of CHF 2011 2010 
RSUP – Restricted Stock Unit Plans 166 180 
MSOP – Management Stock Option Plan 9 9 
PSUP – Performance Share Unit Plan 8 5 
SAR – Share Appreciation Rights (4) 10 
Total share-based payment from continuing operations 179 204 




Exhibit 5 – Expected Volatility 
Expected life 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years 
Historical volatility 22,51% 21,05% 19,98% 19,21% 
Notes: 
- Historical volatility was measured by using daily closing prices of the underlying share. The observations 




Exhibit 6 – Historical Dividend Yield 
 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011





























Exhibit 7 – BSM formula adjusted for the Present value of Dividends22  
      (  )    
    (  ) 
Where: 
   
  (   ⁄ )  (  
(  ) 
 
) 
  √ 
 
       
 √  
S* = S0 – D 
c = Theoretical value of a call option 
S0 = Price of the Underlying option 
D = Present value of expected dividends  
N = Cumulative standard normal distribution 
K = Exercise/ Strike price 
r = Risk-free rate (continuously compounded) 






















                                                             
22 Source: CHRIS, N. A. (1997) Black-Scholes with Dividends. In Black-Scholes and Beyond: Option 
Pricing Models. McGraw-Hill 


















Exhibit 8 – Forecasted Dividends per Share 
a) Average Scenario 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Worst-case scenario 1,95 2,22 2,52 2,86 3,25 3,69 4,20 
Sum of PV if maturity in 2015 9,27       
Sum of PV if maturity in 2016 12,25       
Sum of PV if maturity in 2017 15,59       
Sum of PV if maturity in 2018 19,31       
Note:  
- Since the exercise date is assumed to be in March of N and the dividends are typically paid in April, the last 
dividend to be received by the option holder is the dividend that refers to the reporting year N-1. 
- To calculate the Present value, we assumed the risk-free rates presented in Table 4, in line with the time 
frame considered. For example, when the maturity was assumed to be in 2015, the risk-free rate was the yield 
of a 4Y Swiss Government bond. 
 
b) Worst-case Scenario 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Worst-case scenario 1,95 2,06 2,17 2,28 2,41 2,54 2,67 
Sum of PV if maturity in 2015 8,22       
Sum of PV if maturity in 2016 10,42       
Sum of PV if maturity in 2017 12,71       
Sum of PV if maturity in 2018 15,07       
Note:  
- Since the exercise date is assumed to be in March of N and the dividends are typically paid in April, the last 
dividend to be received by the option holder is the dividend that refers to the reporting year N-1. 
- To calculate the Present value, we assumed the risk-free rates presented in Table 4, in line with the time 
frame considered. For example, when the maturity was assumed to be in 2015, the risk-free rate was the yield 
of a 4Y Swiss Government bond. 
 
 






2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 Avg 
Options 
forfeited 








0,00% 0,00% 0,07% 1,28% 0,00% 0,26% 1,30% 1,65% 0,57% 
a) In 2011 and 2010, the data on the number of options was rounded to millions.  
b) The necessary corrections for stock splits were made. 
 
 
Source: Consolidated Financial Statements of Nestlé Group (from the year 2005 to 2011) from the notes 
“Equity Compensation Plans” and “Share-Based Payments” 
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